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ABSTRACT 
  Realizing the many benefits from Facebook require users to share information 
reciprocally, which has overtime created trillions of bytes of information online—a treasure 
trove for cybercriminals. The sole protection for any user are three sets of privacy protections 
afforded by Facebook: settings that control information privacy (i.e., security of social media 
accounts and identity information), accessibility privacy or anonymity (i.e., manage who can 
connect with a user), and those that control the users’ expressive privacy (i.e., control who can 
see a user’s posts and tag you). Using these settings, however, involves a trade-off between 
making oneself accessible and thereby vulnerable to potential attacks, or enacting stringent 
protections that could potentially make someone inaccessible thereby reducing the benefits that 
are accruable through social media. Using two theoretical frameworks, Uses and Gratifications 
(U&G) and Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), the research examined how individuals 
congitvely juxtaposed the cost of maintaining privacy through the use of these settings against 
the benefits of openness. The application of the U&G framework revealed that social need 
fulfillment was the single most significant benefit driving privacy management. From the cost 
standpoint, the PMT framework pointed to perceived severity impacting expressive and 
information privacy, and perceived susceptability influencing accessibility privacy.   
 
 
Keywords: social media privacy, protection motivation theory, uses and gratifications, cognitive 
process, cost-benefit evaluation
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How People Protect their Privacy on Social Networking Sites: A Cost-Benefit View 
 Platforms such as Facebook help people connect and communicate with others, form new 
relationships, and maintain existing ones (Shahnaz & Wok, 2011). Such relationships provide 
users benefits ranging from personal gratification to social support and social proof from being 
noticed and validated by one’s friends and peers. Not surprisingly, billions of people world wide 
today use social media.  
 But the maintenance of relationships on platforms such as Facebook comes at a cost: People 
need to share information in order to receive feedback from others (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 
2007). Much like in real-world relationships, virtually maintained relationships require 
individuals to not only post updates and share personal information but also to respond to other 
people’s posts and updates in order to reciprocally receive feedback. However, unlike the real 
world, doing so on social media leaves trails of personally identifiable information (PII) that 
remain on the platform’s servers. These trillions of bytes of PII, easily accessible on social media 
platforms, have become a treasure trove for cyber criminals. 
 Cybercrimes frequently occur where users are targeted by phishing messages crafted based 
on users’ likes and dislikes disclosed on social media. There are also incidents of scammers 
using social media to impersonate other people and gain access to users’ personal information. 
Leaking of such information has led to crimes ranging from petty theft to home invasion and 
organizational and national espionage (Dvorak, 2011; Miller, 2012; Riley & Vance, 2012; 
Roche, 2011). Already some 10% of users have reported experiencing a loss of reputation, 
identity, or some form of monetary cost due to PII stolen from their social media accounts. Many 
others—86% in a 2013 Pew study—have made efforts to erase their digital footprint or taken 
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steps to prevent individuals and organizations from observing their online behaviors (Rainie, 
Kiesler, Kang, & Madden, 2013).  
 Presently, the sole protection for any user is the privacy settings provided on Facebook. 
These settings can be broadly classified into three dimensions: settings that control information 
privacy (i.e., protect who can see a user’s identity profile and access a user’s digital account), 
settings that control accessibility privacy (i.e., manage who can connect with a user), and those 
that control the user’s expressive privacy (i.e., control who can manage content related to a 
user’s social image). Using these settings involve a trade-off between making oneself accessible 
and thereby vulnerable to potential attacks and unwanted attention, or enacting stringent 
protections that could reduce social, information and entertainment benefits from social media 
use. Thus, as individuals utilize these Facebook settings, they need to cognitively juxtapose the 
cost of maintaining privacy against the benefits of openness. These cognitive processes reveal 
not only how people think about risk on social media but also how they react to various risk 
scenarios. Knowing this is key to developing usable security, where the focus of extant 
scholarship has been on designing easy-to-use security settings based on assessments of how 
people use security (Braz, Seffah, & M’Raihi, 2007) rather than based on why people use 
security settings in certain ways. Explicating the underlying cognitive cost-benefit appraisal 
processes that lead individuals to enact different privacy protections is thus the central goal of 
the current paper.  
 A theory that provides an assessment of cognitive cost appraisals is Protection Motivation 
Theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975). PMT proposes that people protect themselves from risks based on 
four factors: perceived severity (how adverse is the consequence of a risk), perceived 
susceptibility (the likelihood of the risk), response efficacy (how effective one believes the 
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protective measures are to prevent the risk), and self-efficacy (how much confidence one has to 
adopt the protective measures on their own) (Rogers, 1975). These four factors have been 
positively linked to enactment of protective behaviors (Witte, 1992), thusly providing a means 
for relating the users’ cognitive appraisal of the cost of a cyber breach to the enactment of 
various privacy protections on Facebook.  
 A framework that is well-suited to assessing the perceived benefits of using media is Uses 
and Gratifications (U&G). U&G proposes that a finite number of gratifications sought drive the 
use of a medium (Sundar & Limperos, 2013). These include social, information, entertainment, 
emotional and escape needs (Sundar & Limperos, 2013)—all of which have been linked to the 
utilization of Facebook. Thus, U&G based gratifications sought from Facebook provide a means 
for relating the perceived benefits from using Facebook to the enactment of various privacy 
protections on Facebook.  
 Using these two theoretical frameworks, the current study examines the degree to which 
perceived costs enhance protection and perceived benefits foster a relaxation of the three 
available privacy settings on Facebook. The data for the study come from a cross-sectional 
survey of college students, an important demographic of social media users as well as frequent 
targets of cyber criminals. The paper begins with an exposition of the two theoretical 
frameworks followed by the methods, measures, findings, and discussion of results in ensuing 
sections.  
Theoretical Premise 
Three Dimensions of Facebook Privacy 
At its broadest level, privacy is a protection that people enact to selectively control 
others’ access to themselves (Altman, 1975; Westin, 1967). In the real world privacy 
HOW PEOPLE PROTECT THEIR PRIVACY  
6 
management involves the control of interpersonal boundaries to reduce discrepancies between 
one’s desired and actual levels of privacy (Altman, 1975). To control this boundary, people take 
cognitive ownership of their private information and consider information to be private when 
individuals believe that the information belongs to them (Petronio, 2002). In the real world, 
private information is often implicitly protected by mutually understood, unwritten, and 
normative cognitive rules of sharing (e.g., anything personal you tell your friend is expected to 
be kept private) and through explicit legal guarantees (e.g., anything personal you reveal to your 
therapist is legally protected). In social media, however, these rules have to be actively managed 
by the individual through the use of the privacy management settings provided by platforms such 
as Facebook.   
The privacy management settings Facebook affords can be broadly categorized using the 
classification proposed by DeCew (1997) into information privacy, accessibility privacy, and 
expressive privacy.  
Information privacy focuses on the control of access to one’s digital information. User-
disclosed information on Facebook, such as name, gender, residence, birth date, employment and 
education history, contact information and relationship status, constitute one’s social identity. 
This identity is linked to one’s private and economic life and a breach of this data could lead to 
serious issues such as identity theft and online harassment. For instance, a hacker with access to 
these pieces of digital information could easily steal an user’s identity, open credit cards, or 
procure access to other online accounts. The protection measure available to control digital data 
access is Facebook’s “security settings” (see Figure 1 in appendices), which monitors login 
information and notifies users of suspicious activity. 
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Accessibility privacy involves control over the acquisition of information that could 
provide access to the individual (DeCew, 1997). Accessibility privacy focuses on the access to 
individuals rather than their private information (i.e., information privacy) and is premised on the 
idea that, at their core, individuals do not wish to be found or disturbed by others. This 
presumption corresponds to Westin’s (1967) classical privacy theory that emphasizes solitude, 
intimacy, anonymity and reserve. On Facebook, accessibility privacy involves managing how 
one is found on the platform. To be found by your friends and acquaintances is, on the one hand, 
a necessary step towards realizing any of the rewards from social media, but on the other hand, 
being found makes users’ easier targets of phishers and scammers who can utilize these 
accessible pieces of personal information to craft attacks. For instance, merely being searchable 
on social media makes it possible to target the user with a phony friend-request, a common type 
of social network-based phishing attack where the attacker impersonates another person and 
attempts to friend the user or sends a malware-laden message through the platform. To protect 
one’s anonymity, Facebook’s “privacy settings and tools” (see Figure 2 in appendices) help users 
control who can find them using email or phone numbers, as well as who can send them private 
messages and friend-requests. 
Expressive privacy involves control over how one expresses one’s self-identity or 
personhood through speech or activity (DeCew, 1997). Self-disclosure on social media is, in 
some ways, similar to public performances, as described by Goffman (1959), where individuals 
control or guide the formation of impressions by altering one’s appearance or manner. Like these 
on-stage performances, Facebook users maintain desired impressions based on different times, 
audiences, or situations. However, the audiences on Facebook are large, diverse, and reflect 
overlapping social spheres (Joinson, Houghton, Vasalou, & Marder, 2011). Consequently, norms 
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and expectations differ across these social spheres, necessitating a tailoring of online sharing to 
accommodate these disparate audiences. Users can manage their social image by selective self-
presentation (Rui & Stefanone, 2013), or by controlling other-provided information that could 
affect one’s social image (e.g., photo tags and comments from a user’s friends). Undesired 
audiences and a loss of control over one’s social image could result in damaged reputations 
(Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn, & Hughes, 2009). The control of one’s social image on Facebook is 
enacted through the “timeline and tagging settings” (see Figure 3 in appendices), which manages 
who can add to a user’s timeline, see posts on a timeline, or add tags. 
The enactment of these three sets of Facebook privacy settings are based on a cognitive 
assessment of the costs of ostensibly getting hacked, breached, or maligned against the many 
benefits that could accrue from being available, accessible, and reciprocally active on social 
media. The likely costs that drive the enactment of Facebook’s privacy protections are examined 
next using PMT.   
Protection Motivation Theory on Facebook Privacy 
PMT was first introduced by Rogers (1975) to explore the effects of fear appeal messages 
on persuasion. This framework describes four factors that are cognitively processed when a 
threat is presented: perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, response efficacy, and self-
efficacy (Rogers, 1975). Perceived severity and perceived susceptibility represent threat 
appraisal, while response efficacy and self-efficacy represent coping appraisal (Rogers, 1983). 
These appraisals involve personal considerations of the breadth and scope of the threat and the 
individuals capability of being able to deal with it. Thus, together, they signify the costs 
associated with a perceived risk or threat.   
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PMT predicts that people are most likely to adopt recommended protective behaviors 
when they believe that the associated costs from it is likely to be high, that is, the threat is 
serious, that they are susceptible to it, and that they can execute these behaviors on their own and 
these enacted behaviors can prevent the risk (Rogers, 1983). The theory has been successfully 
applied to explain the enactment of a wide range of personal health-related behaviors (Floyd, 
Prentice‐Dunn, & Rogers, 2000), including the prevention of adolescent drug trafficking (Wu, 
Stanton, Li, Galbraith, & Cole, 2005), improving security policy compliance in organizations 
(Herath & Rao, 2009), and even anti-nuclear war behaviors (Wolf, Gregory, & Stephan, 1986). 
More recent research has extended it to the technology-related risk domain to study online 
privacy intrusion (Meso, Yi Ding, & Shuting Xu, 2013; Milne, Labrecque, & Cromer, 2009; 
Sangmi, Bagchi-sen, Morrell, Rao, & Upadhyaya, 2009), identity theft (Lai, Li, & Hsieh, 2012), 
online spying and hacking (Chenoweth, Minch, & Gattiker, 2009) and other, broad I.T. threats 
(Liang & Xue, 2009; Moser, Bruppacher, & Mosler, 2011). 
Almost all these studies suggest an enhancement of protections in the face of increased 
cognitive cost and coping appraisals. While none of these work focuses on the enactment of 
privacy protections on social media, they altogether provide the impetus for hypothesizing that 
increased cost and coping appraisals of risks from social media use would lead to an 
enhancement of the protections afforded on Facebook to control information, accessibility, and 
expressive privacy. 
H1: User’s a) perceived severity, b) perceived susceptibility, c) response efficacy, and d) 
self-efficacy towards unauthorized access of digital data will enhance the frequency and 
use of Facebook’s privacy protections to control information privacy. 
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H2: User’s a) perceived severity, b) perceived susceptibility, c) response efficacy, and d) 
self-efficacy towards loss of anonymity will enhance the frequency and use of 
Facebook’s privacy protections to control accessibility privacy. 
H3: User’s a) perceived severity, b) perceived susceptibility, c) response efficacy, and d) 
self-efficacy towards the potential loss of social image will enhance the frequency and 
use of Facebook’s privacy protections to control expressive privacy. 
 While PMT-based appraisals are expected to enhance protections, considerations of the 
perceived benefits from social media are expected to stymie the enactment of protections. The 
perceived benefits of Facebook are examined next using the lens provided by the Uses and 
Gratifications paradigm.  
Uses and Gratifications (U&G) of Facebook 
 The U&G paradigm is an audience-centric approach that presumes people have innate 
needs or benefits that they seek to satisfy through the selection and use of media.  
 Recent applications of this paradigm have led to the discovery of a variety of 
gratifications driving Facebook use depending on whether the research focused on top-level 
gratifications or specific Facebook functionalities. For instance, Ray (2007) found three first-
order drivers of Facebook use, primarily information, surveillance, and entertainment use. With a 
focus on specific functionalities, Raacke and Bonds-Raacke (2008) found that people use 
Facebook for keeping in touch with old and new friends, locating old friends and making new 
friends, as well as posting and looking at photos. In line with the latter approach, Joinson (2008) 
found seven unique U&G of Facebook including social connection, shared identities, content, 
social investigation, social network surfing, and status updating.  
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 The present research focused on the first-order gratifications people derive from 
Facebook rather then the gratifications they derive from its individual functions. This is because 
Facebook’s offerings are constantly evolving with technology, limiting the implications of 
functionality-focused research findings to the short-term. A guide to the top-level gratifications 
from Facebook comes from a recent exhaustive review of U&G studies from 1940 to 2011 that 
found media use to be driven chiefly by considerations of social, identity, information, and 
entertainment needs (Sundar & Limperos, 2013). These broadly map on to the three top-level 
gratifications made possible through Facebook use. Specially, the gratifications are: information 
(e.g., users can follow current events and various organizations’ updates), social (e.g., make 
friends and keep in touch with old friends) and entertainment (e.g., play games). 
 Fulfilling information needs require seeking knowledge about events and people; social 
needs involve being abreast with the happenings around us in the social world; and entertainment 
needs require mood alleviating activities. Satisfying these through Facebook require a degree of 
openness, availability, and accessibility by other users on the platform. For instance, Facebook 
users’ information needs can be fulfilled by subscribing to public Facebook pages’ timelines, 
which makes a user’s profile visible to the page admin and all others who follow the same page. 
Social needs can be fulfilled by sharing personal thoughts and activities through status updates. 
Finally, fulfilling entertainment needs on Facebook can be done by playing social games or 
shopping, which requires interaction through the site, often with strangers, that cannot be 
accomplished without revealing profile information. Thus, realizing the benefits of Facebook 
require the relaxation of the afforded privacy controls, which lead to the following hypotheses: 
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H4: The perceived a) social needs, b) information needs, and c) entertainment needs 
fulfilled by Facebook will reduce the frequency and use of Facebook’s privacy 
protections to control information privacy. 
H5: The perceived a) social needs, b) information needs, and c) entertainment needs 
fulfilled by Facebook will reduce the frequency and use of Facebook’s privacy 
protections to control accessibility privacy. 
H6: The perceived a) social needs, b) information needs, and c) entertainment needs 
fulfilled by Facebook will reduce the frequency and use of Facebook’s privacy 
protections to control expressive privacy. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Data for the study were gathered using a cross sectional survey of undergraduate students 
enrolled in communication classes at a large Northeastern university. A total of 513 participants 
(57% male) responded to an IRB approved online survey over a two-week period in the fall of 
the 2014. 
Measures 
Facebook Privacy Protections 
Facebook users’ degree of privacy protection management was measured using the 
settings available on Facebook under the following categories: security settings, privacy settings 
and tools, and timeline and tagging settings. For each function within these categories, 
participants were asked the extent to which they were aware of the setting (i.e., who could access 
the setting) followed by the frequency with which they changed the setting using a 1 (Not at all 
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frequently) to 5 (Very frequently) response scale. To accurately ascertain the intensity with which 
each setting was enacted, the individual awareness/visibility responses were weighted by the 
frequency with which the setting was changed.  
Privacy protection towards social image. Six items measured participants’ level of 
openness towards allowing other users to see their timeline or to add to it. A Likert-type scale of 
1 (I am not aware of this setting)–5 (No one), where 1 signified an open profile while 5 signified 
a private profile, was used. Sample items read: “Who can see the status updates or photos you 
post” and “Who do you accept status updates or photo tagging requests from.” An Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted on the items (mean=3.38, s.d.=.78, α=.92). Those items 
were then weighted by the respective frequency of change response and averaged to create an 
index for final analysis (mean=6.42, s.d.=3.37).  
Privacy protection towards anonymity. Four items measured participants’ level of 
openness towards allowing other users to contact them. Again, a Likert-type scale of 1–5, was 
used. Sample items read: “Who can look you up through Facebook using your email address or 
phone number” and “Who can send you private messages.” Similarly, an EFA was conducted on 
the items (mean=2.73, s.d.=.75, α=.71). The items were weighted by the respective frequency of 
change response and averaged to create an index for final analysis (mean=5.42, s.d.=3.48).  
Privacy protection towards digital data. Six items measured participants’ level of 
awareness of the protective measures that Facebook offers to prevent the loss of digital data.  
Sample items include “I am aware of the Secure Browsing setting” and “I am aware of the Login 
Notifications setting.” Each item was scored using a Likert-type scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 
5 (Strongly agree). EFA was conducted on the items (mean=3.13, s.d.=.90, α=.88). The items 
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were weighted by the respective frequency of change response and averaged to create an index 
for final modeling (mean=6.17, s.d.=3.90).  
 PMT based measures of perceived cost 
 The independent variable of PMT was measured using a Likert-type scale of 1 (Strongly 
disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). 
Perceived severity. Nine items measured participants’ perceived level of severity toward 
losses from each dimension of online privacy. Sample items read: “Having my personal 
information or photos stolen through Facebook would be a serious problem for me” 
(unauthorized access of digital data), “Having people I do not know send me messages or friend 
requests through Facebook would be a serious problem for me” (loss of anonymity), and 
“Having people I do not know see my status updates or photos in Facebook would be a serious 
problem for me” (loss of social image). EFA was conducted on the items and two dimensions 
were revealed. The first dimension was related to unauthorized access of digital data 
(mean=3.61, s.d.=.87, α=.85), and items in this dimension were averaged to create an index for 
testing H1 and H4. The second dimension was related to loss of anonymity and social image 
(mean=3.14, s.d.=.78, α=.82), and the responses in this dimension were averaged to create an 
index for testing H2, H3, H5 and H6. 
Perceived susceptibility. Nine items measured participants’ level of susceptibility from 
attacks targeted at each dimension of online privacy. Sample items read: “I feel that I could be 
subjected to identity theft or hacking through Facebook” (unauthorized access of digital data), “I 
feel that people I do not know can easily send me messages or friend requests through Facebook” 
(loss of anonymity), and “I feel that people I do not know can easily see my status updates or 
photos in Facebook” (loss of social image). Again, An EFA netted two dimensions and a closer 
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inspection of items suggested that one dimension was related to unauthorized access of digital 
data (mean=3.21, s.d.=.68, α=.83). Responses on this dimension were averaged into an index for 
testing H1 and H4. The other dimension was related to loss of anonymity and social image 
(mean=2.91, s.d.=.88, α=.87) and the responses in this dimension were averaged to create an 
index for H2, H3, H5 and H6. 
Response efficacy. Five items measure participants’ beliefs about the extent to which 
Facebook’s privacy settings were effective in protecting their account. Sample items read: “By 
changing my privacy settings, I believe that Facebook will protect my personal information or 
photos” and “If someone is trying to access my personal info, Facebook privacy settings are 
effective to prevent it.” An EFA was conducted on the items before the responses were averaged 
to create an index (mean=3.20, s.d.=.75, α=.89). 
Self-efficacy. Seven items measured participants’ beliefs that they could manage their 
Facebook privacy settings on their own. Sample items read: “I believe that I have the ability to 
protect my personal information on Facebook” and “I feel confident that I can change my 
Facebook privacy settings without help from anyone.” An EFA was conducted on the items 
before the responses were averaged to create an index (mean=3.56, s.d.=.73, α=.91). 
 U&G based measures of perceived benefits from Facebook  
The independent variables of U&G were measured using a Likert-type scale of 1 
(Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). Based on prior research (Joinson, 2008; Raacke & 
Bonds-Raacke, 2008; Ray, 2007; Sundar & Limperos, 2013), 17 items measured participants’ 
likely benefits from Facebook. Example items read: “I use Facebook because I can make new 
friends” and “I use Facebook because it diverts my attention when I am bored or stressed.” An 
EFA conducted on the items revealed three dimensions mapping on to the three gratification 
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dimensions explicated by prior research: social needs (mean=2.83, s.d.=.79, α=.87), information 
needs (mean=3.35, s.d.=.77, α=.81) and entertainment needs (mean=3.43, s.d.=.80, α=.80). The 
responses in each dimension were averaged to create an index. 
 Findings 
H1 and H4, H 2 and H5, and H3 and H6, examined the relative influence of PMT based 
costs versus U&G based benefits, on the enactment of information privacy, accessibility privacy, 
and expressive privacy protections afforded by Facebook, respectively. Each set of hypotheses 
was tested using a hierarchical regression with PMT-based perceived costs and U&G-based 
benefits as independent measures, and the weighted variable measuring enactment of the 
respective Facebook’s privacy setting as the dependent variable. In each model, perceived 
severity and perceived susceptibility towards unauthorized access of digital data, the user’s 
response efficacy, and self-efficacy were entered in the first block, followed by the U&G 
variables (i.e., social needs, information needs, and entertainment needs) in the second block.  
The first model testing H1 and H4 was significant, F(7, 505) = 15.06, p<.001, explaining 
16% of the variance in the enactment of Facebook’s information privacy settings. Table 1 
presents the tests. Perceived susceptibility (β=.13, t=3.07, p=.002) positively predicted protection 
enactment towards digital data. Additionally, social needs positively predicted protection 
enactment (β=.43, t=8.53, p<.001), while information needs (β=-.14, t=-2.55, p=.011) negatively 
predicted protection enactment towards unauthorized access of digital data. Therefore, H1 and 
H4 were partially supported. 
Table 1. 
Testing H1 and H4 on protection enactment towards unauthorized access of digital data 
(information privacy)  
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 First block (PMT) Second block (U&G) 
 β S.E. β S.E. 
Perceived severity -.14* .23 -.09 .22 
Perceived susceptibility .20** .26 .13* .25 
Response efficacy .11* .26 .05 .25 
Self-efficacy .003 .29 .05 .27 
Social needs   .43** .25 
Information needs   -.14* .28 
Entertainment needs   -.10 .25 
F, Adj. R2 F (7, 505) = 15.06**, .16 
* p < .05 (two-tailed), ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Next, The analysis was repeated to examine the enactment of accessibility privacy 
settings afforded by Facebook . Table 2 presents the results from testing H2 and H5.  
Table 2. 
Testing H2 and H5 on protection enactment for loss of anonymity (accessibility privacy)  
 First block (PMT) Second block (U&G) 
 β S.E. β S.E. 
Perceived severity .24** .20 .19** .19 
Perceived susceptibility .15* .17 .08 .17 
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Response efficacy .03 .23 .001 .22 
Self-efficacy -.18** .24 -.11* .23 
Social needs   .38** .22 
Information needs   -.14* .25 
Entertainment needs   -.12* .22 
F, Adj. R2 F (7, 505) = 16.70**, .18 
* p < .05 (two-tailed), ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
The regression model was also significant, F(7, 505) = 16.70, p<.001, and explained 18% 
of the variance in the protection enactment. In the model, perceived severity (β=.19, t=4.51, 
p<.001) positively predicted protection enactment, while self-efficacy negatively predicted 
protection enactment (β=-.11, t=-2.20, p=.029). Among the U&G predictors, social needs 
positively predicted protection enactment (β=.38, t=7.47, p<.001); protection enactment was 
negatively predicted by information needs (β=-.14, t=-2.52, p=.012) and entertainment needs 
(β=-.12, t=-2.33, p=.02). Based on the findings, H5 was partially supported. 
Lastly, the model testing H3 and H6 concerning the enactment of expressive privacy 
protections afforded by Facebook was also significant, F(7, 505) = 13.84, p<.001, and explained 
15% of the variance in privacy enactment. The results of These tests are presented in Table 3. In 
this model, perceived severity (β=.24, t=5.49, p<.001) positively predicted protection enactment. 
From the U&G constructs, social needs (β=.31, t=6.002, p<.001) positively predicted protection. 
Table 3. 
Testing H3 and H6 on protection enactment for loss of social image (expressive privacy)  
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 First block (PMT) Second block (U&G) 
 β S.E. β S.E. 
Perceived severity .29** .19 .24** .19 
Perceived susceptibility .12** .16 .06 .16 
Response efficacy .01 .22 -.03 .22 
Self-efficacy .10 .23 -.05 .23 
Social needs   .31** .22 
Information needs   -.06 .24 
Entertainment needs   -.07 .21 
F, Adj. R2 F (7, 505) = 13.84**, .15 
* p < .05 (two-tailed), ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
Discussion 
 The research examined the cognitive cost-benefit appraisal processes that underlie users’ 
enactment of privacy protections on Facebook. PMT provided the framework to assess users’ 
cognitive cost appraisals while U&G provided the lens to understand the perceived benefits that 
drive their privacy enactments.  
 Based on the relative beta weights across the regressions tested, it appears that users’ 
privacy management on Facebook is premised on the juxtaposition of benefits against cost, 
rather than costs versus benefits.  
The application of U&G framework pointed to social need fulfillment as the single most 
significant Facebook benefit that enhances the protection of information privacy, accessibility 
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privacy, and expressive privacy. Social needs, such as finding new friends, maintaining existing 
relationships, and getting social support, likely leads to a more active consideration of who gets 
access to the users digital data, who has access to the individual, and who can influence their 
self-presentation. Social needs also likely foster impression management and tailored self-
presentation. In contrast, information needs and entertainment needs appear to relax the intensity 
of enactment, ostensibly because on Facebook, individuals can seek information by lurking or by 
divulging limited profile information to information and content provoders.   
 Relative to the benefits, the perceived costs of social media use stem from the losses one 
could potentially incur and the effort it would take to mitigate the loss. The testing of the PMT 
framework pointed to perceived severity and perceived susceptibility of privacy incursions 
having significant impacts on privacy management. From these, perceived severity had a 
relatively stronger influence on the enactment of expressive privacy (i.e., loss of social image) 
and accessibility privacy (i.e., loss of annoymity). This is likely again a reflection of the social 
nature of Facebook use, where most people use the platform for self-presentation, making the 
fear of social losses stemming from inaccurate self-presentation or public embarrassment a 
bigger, more significant threat. In contrast, digital or information privacy losses, although 
important, are viewed as less impactful, perhaps because of the private way in which these costs 
can be incurred. For instance, the social embarrassment from a photograph that shows a user in a 
negative light being posted is harder to deal with privately than the loss of a password or some 
digital information.  
 These findings have several practical implications towards privacy protection behaviors 
on SNSs and for the design of usable security, where research tends to focus on designing easy to 
use and useful security settings, often ignorning the fact that not all settings are underutilized 
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merely because of design. Most settings, it appears, are ignored because users care less about 
them and instead focus solely on settings that protect social information leaks. Knowing this 
allows for better security design and more effective communication about the benefits of various 
settings. Such communication could emphasize the relatedness of all security settings, connect 
the social implications of the loss of any of them, and explain how coping with one requires 
monitoring all the others. Additionally, given the influence of individual level differences in 
coping efficacy, security desingers should develop mechanisms to communicate in a simple way 
the value of each setting as well as how individuals could deal with breaches that stem from the 
misappropriation of any setting.  
 However, in-line with any sample-based, social science research, the study has a few 
limitations, beginning with the use of a student sample. While college students are an important 
demographic of social media users and are often targets of cyber criminals, they are also a-
typical of the broader U.S. or global population of Internet users. This somewhat restricts the 
generalizability of the findings to just college age adults. Another limitation is the use of self-
reports, which are subject to errors in memory as well participant biases from being primed by 
other survey items. For instance, subjects could have reported their desired privacy setting or the 
setting they felt the researcher was attempting to gauge. Finally, the study used a cross-sectional 
design, where the dependent and independent measures were collected at the same time and 
where relational tests were supported by theory rather than established by natural time.  
 These are limitations of all social science research that utilizes this approach (many of 
which do) and requires future research to address. Research could use an adult, national or global 
sample, behavioral measures of Facebook settings procured from Facebook, and experiments to 
assess what settings users changed in response to a privacy beach. Such research could be done 
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in other countries and also focus on other social networking platforms such as Twitter and 
LinkedIn, to examine the cross-cultural and multi-platform generalizability of these results.  
 All said, however, the findings of the study are noteworthy. Decision science has long 
accepted the idea that people go through a cost-benefit evaluation prior to making important 
decisions. None have, however, addressed the theoretical constituents of costs and benefits or its 
implications on the enactment of the privacy protections afforded by social media. By extending 
the theoretical lens provided by PMT and U&G, the present study not only explains the cognitive 
processes but also allow us pinpoint the specific costs and specific benefits that drive the 
enactment of various privacy protections on Facebook.  
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Figure 1. Screen shot of Facebook’s security settings, captured on October 30, 2014. 
 
 
Figure 2. Screen shot of Facebook’s privacy settings and tools, captured on October 30, 2014. 
 
 
Figure 3. Screen shot of Facebook’s timeline and tagging settings, captured on October 30, 
2014. 
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